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ABSTRACT 
 
In the last few years, small firms have had difficulties to finance their projects via the traditional 
bank system. A new type of financing has recently appeared in Europe and in particular in 
France: the crowdfunding. It is a method for funding a variety of new ventures, allowing 
individual founders of for-profit, cultural, or social projects to request funding from many 
individuals via Internet. Our paper contributes to the literature by introducing this financial 
innovation and building a theoretical framework to explain its success. We also discuss some 
more practical issues to enhance crowdfunding in France.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the subprime crisis, banks have reduced the number of loans to businesses of any size. According to 
data from La Banque de France (Bank of France), the rate of credit to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and 
micro-enterprises was stable between April and July 2013 , while the rate of credit to medium-sized business and 
large enterprises increased by approximately 15 basis points over this period. The spread rate between loans to firms 
with more than 3 years and those granted to companies under 3 years decreased from 100 to 75 basis points. The 
credit rate of the best listed companies is significantly lower than those of poorer quotes (about 70 basis points). 
This strongly impacts corporate finance and reduces their development. An inherent problem that entrepreneurs face 
at the very beginning of their entrepreneurial initiative is to attract outside capital, given the lack of collateral and 
sufficient cash-flows and the presence of significant information asymmetry with investors (Cosh et al., 2009).  
 
More recently, some entrepreneurs have started to rely on the Internet to directly seek financial help from 
the general public (the “crowd”) instead of approaching financial investors such as business angels, banks or venture 
capital funds (Kleemann et al., 2008; Lambert and Schwienbacher, 2010). This technique, called “crowdfunding”, 
has made possible to seek capital for project-specific investments as well as for starting up new ventures. 
Crowdfunding was originally used by creative actors such as artists, musicians and writers as alternative financing. 
Indeed, it can allow finding the necessary funds for the completion of a work retaining the full copyright. The main 
interest of crowdfunding is the financial aspect. However, it also creates an opportunity for communication and 
creates a real community. Its role is becoming increasingly important and is presented as an alternative financing 
system to traditional modes of financing.  
 
A prominent example is Trampoline Systems, a UK-based software company that intends to raise £ 1 
million through crowdfunding. It shows that crowdfunding may potentially be a mean to raise funds not only for 
small projects but also for high-growth start-ups that are typically financed by business angels and even venture 
capital funds. Whether it will become a meaningful alternative to angel finance and venture capital still needs to be 
seen. Since 2009, in France, we note that the creation of platforms has more than doubled each year to reach 22 
platforms in 2012. Since its inception in 2007 in France, crowdfunding has risen over € 55 million and it was able to 
finance 17,000 projects. These results are all the most important, when we speak to the pioneers of this funding:  the 
United States. Indeed, more than a billion dollars has been raised in recent years.  
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In view of these results, can we tell today that crowdfunding is no longer an emerging track but a viable 
source of funding? To answer this question, we organized the paper as follows. Section 2 introduces the principals 
of crowdfunding. Section 3 discusses the existing literature and shows that solid theoretical arguments may explain 
the observed success of crowdfunding. Section 4 studies the impact of the French legal reform on the development 
of crowdfunding. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. CONTEXT OF CROWDFUNDING 
 
Crowdfunding is a novel method for funding a variety of new ventures, allowing individual founders of for-
profit, cultural, or social projects to request funding from many individuals, often in return for future products or 
equity. Crowdfunding projects can range greatly in both goal and magnitude, from small artistic projects to 
entrepreneurs seeking hundreds or thousands of dollars in seed capital as an alternative to traditional venture capital 
investment (Schwienbacher and Larralde, 2010). In a few words, crowdfunding is the financing of a project or a 
venture by a group of individuals instead of professional parties for instance, banks, venture capitalists or business 
angels. Crowdfunding draws inspiration from concepts like micro-finance (Morduch, 1999) and crowdsourcing 
(Poetz and Schreier, 2012), but represents its own unique category of fundraising, facilitated by a growing number 
of internet sites devoted to the topic.  
 
As in any emergent field, the popular and academic conceptions of crowdfunding are in a state of evolution 
which makes complete definitions arbitrarily limiting. In one of the few published overviews of the topic, 
Schwienbacher and Larralde (2010) define crowdfunding as “an open call, essentially through the Internet, for the 
provision of financial resources either in form of donation or in exchange for some form of reward and/or voting 
rights in order to support initiatives for specific purposes.” However, even this expansive definition potentially 
leaves out examples that scholars in various fields have labelled “crowdfunding,” including internet-based peer-to-
peer lending (Lin and Viswanathan, 2013) and fundraising drives initiated by fans of a music group (Burkett, 2011). 
 
A broad definition of crowdfunding is therefore elusive, especially as crowdfunding covers so many current 
(and likely future) uses across many disciplines. Instead, we would argue that, for academics examining new 
ventures and entrepreneurial finance where crowdfunding is particularly salient, a narrower definition of the term is 
preferable. In an entrepreneurial context, the following definition provides specificity. Crowdfunding refers to the 
efforts by entrepreneurial individuals and groups – cultural, social, and for-profit – to fund their ventures by drawing 
on relatively small contributions from a relatively large number of individuals using the internet, without standard 
financial intermediaries. 
 
In the meantime, several platforms have emerged that help intermediate between crowdfunders (those who 
invest in projects) and individuals with a project. There are a lot of platforms in crowdfunding but we can mention 
some: babyloan.org is the first European website of crowdfunding created in 2008 in France. This platform wants to 
expand into other European countries such as Germany, Italy, and Spain. Team Babyloan gathered 2.75 million 
Euros solidarity loans enjoyed by 8 000 micro-entrepreneurs in 12 different countries (including France). 
KissKissBankBank.com is another platform created in France in 2010 and it is now an international platform.  
 
Crowdfunding is a mechanism to collect funds for realization of projects that come from companies or 
individuals. All funds are collected from Internet users through Internet platforms that provide visibility to different 
projects. Some figures help to understand the popularity of this new funding. According to the Association Funding 
Participatory France, crowdfunding helped raise 40 million Euros invested in 60,000 projects between 2007 and 
2012 in France, including 25 million Euros for the single year of 2012. It represented $ 2.7 billion in 2012 
worldwide, spread over 308 platforms for more than a million successful fundraising; this represents an 81% 
increase in one year. The U.S. Massolution firm provides $ 5 billion in 2013 and the firm Xerfi provides $ 80 
million for France. Forbes makes forecasts on the potential funding crowdfunding to 1000 billion in 2020. 
According to Deloitte, $ 6 billion will be collected throughout the world via the crowdfunding in 2013. 
 
To understand this method of financing, it is first necessary to study the principals of this financing mode. 
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2.1 Funding Models 
 
 There are four types of platforms, each corresponding to a distinct form of transaction: 
 
 Platforms donations: the user provides financial support to the project without receiving anything in return. 
The project owner retains all its intellectual property. 
 Non-monetary reward crowdfunding: the user provides financial support to the project and receives and 
non-monetary return such as a DVD for supporting a film production. Platforms loans: it is a loan with or 
without interest, which is granted by a user to an individual or organization without going through a 
financial institution. 
 Platforms financing with equity or co-production of the qualified investor user acquires an interest in the 
project and became co-producer and the right in exchange for financial compensation in the event of 
commercial success of the project. The project manager may have to sell part of its intellectual property, 
unlike the other three platforms. 
 
 Figure 1 shows the success of crowdfunding depending on the industry.   
 
 
Figure 1: Comparison Between Succeed Rates By Category 
 
Source: europecrowdfunding.org 
 
2.2 Operating Model 
 
To set the operating model of crowdfunding, we must take into account two aspects: on the one hand, the 
investor who wants to invest some money in a project that interests and secondly, the holder of a project for the 
creation of a company that does not have the funds needed to start his business and does not wish to appeal to bank 
credit. And crowdfunding may have a primary function of funding but also investment. These two dimensions are 
found on the internet via a platform. The projects are presented by their holders and investors. This operation is easy 
to use and has the advantage of being transparent for the user knows what it funds, according to the fact that a choice 
has made itself and according to its own values. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
3.1 Literature Review: A Synthesis 
 
According to Kleemann et al. (2008), companies make use of the crowd mainly for cost- reduction reasons. 
By participating in the product design and improvement, users contribute to creating value for the company. 
Moreover, this allows the company to reduce the length of new product development as well as its costs, to have a 
better customer acceptance, and to increase the customers’ perception of product newness. Within the crowdfunding 
activities, consumers and/or individuals provide needed capital to the company to finance its investments such as 
acquire new assets or pay employees. Besides, crowds may at times be more efficient than individuals or small 
teams (Howe, 2008).
 
According to Brabham (2008b), the efficiency of crowds in solving problems of companies is 
related to its composition; the more diverse it is, the more efficient it can be. Surowiecki (2004) explains that the 
‘wisdom of crowd’ is due to crowd’s solutions aggregating to each other. In other terms, members of the crowd may 
build up their own solution using others’ suggestions and hence end up having better solutions overall. Lévy (1997) 
goes even further with his notion of “collective intelligence”: ‘no one knows everything, everyone knows 
something, and all knowledge resides in humanity’. It makes pretty clear the fact that knowledge becomes more 
important as communities share it. 
 
While crowdfunding (and crowdsourcing in general) can be useful for companies seeking solutions to their 
problems, it can also provide valuable signals on the market potential of a product they wish to launch. As argued by 
Lambert and Schwienbacher (2010), at times the use of crowdfunding can be seen as an excuse to generate hype 
around a new product in order to create a marketing campaign in which consumers are able to participate. For the 
company, it can provide an indication on whether there will be a demand for the product. This is best in the case for 
instance for artists that use Sellaband.com to purchase the CD. 
 
Finally, Franke and Klausberger (2008) notice that the phenomenon of crowdsourcing (and thus also 
crowdfunding) is currently a working concept, because it is not broadly used. If more and more companies start 
using it, the resource ‘crowd’ will become scarce. 
 
Different sources of financing exist among each category. Some of these types of financing can be used 
together with crowdfunding. This is notably the case of bootstrapping techniques
1
 (Bhidé, 1992; Winborg and 
Landstrom, 2001; Ebben and Johnson, 2006). In addition, crowdfunding actually looks pretty similar to 
bootstrapping in certain matters. In particular, bootstrappers try to use as many alternative resources as possible, and 
that is what entrepreneurs do when they exploit capabilities of crowdfunders. In both cases, founders use creative 
ways to finance their investments, while avoiding traditional investors. At the same time, crowdfunding differs from 
bootstrapping in many ways; most importantly, founders relying on crowdfunding do seek to attract external 
investors, unlike bootstrappers who primarily rely on internal resources and active cash management techniques. 
 
3.2 Factors Influencing The Use Of Crowdfunding 
 
 When you choose how to finance his company, an entrepreneur needs to take into account several factors. 
We discuss below factors likely to be important for the use of crowdfunding. 
 
3.2.1 Lack Of Pre-Existing Resources 
 
The first important question is about the entrepreneur’s pre-resources: what does he possess to secure the 
investment on fund providers? Does he have the required skills to run the project and make it successful? At times, 
this may be the case; in other times not. 
 
                                                 
1 It is a situation in which an entrepreneur starts a company with little capital. An individual is said to be bootstrapping when he or she attempts to 
found and build a company from personal finances or from the operating revenues of the new company. Compared to using venture capital, 
bootstrapping can be beneficial because the entrepreneur is able to maintain control over all decisions. On the downside, however, this form of 
financing may place unnecessary financial risk on the entrepreneur. Furthermore, bootstrapping may not provide enough investment for the 
company to become successful at a reasonable rate. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2014 Volume 30, Number 6 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1923 The Clute Institute 
Besides, the manager’s competencies might also influence his need for additional managerial support in 
sales, marketing, accounting, distribution or any other field. This can be provided mainly by equity investors (e.g., 
VC funds, business angels and strategic investors) who already have experience in running a company as well as 
previous knowledge about the industry. Other sources such as debt are said to provide ‘stupid money’, since they do 
not come with any support. Keuschnigg (2004) and Botazzi and Da Rin (2001) show that innovative companies 
which benefit from external support from VC funds perform better than the average and have higher growth rates. 
Also, collateral is often required for obtaining debt finance. As a consequence, Ueda (2004) shows that 
entrepreneurs with little collateral would be more likely to obtain financing from VC funds than from banks. 
 
3.2.2 Risk Moral Hazard And Information Asymmetry 
 
What risk an entrepreneur can support is a condition to choose a funding. Indeed, managers take risks, but 
shareholders are those who actually carry it (Short, 1994). As a result, equity finance is a way to spread risk over 
different people. In contrast, debt finance makes the entrepreneur (provided he is the only shareholder) to bear the 
risk alone. Therefore, the financial structure of a company is influenced by the original riskiness of the project along 
with the risk-taking personality of the entrepreneur. 
 
Finally, information asymmetry is another issue in financing entrepreneurial initiatives. This is the common 
issue of information asymmetry, whereby different parties engaged in a deal do not have access to the same level of 
information (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Narayanan, 1998). In the case of crowdfunding, this issue may be even more 
pronounced. Indeed, investors are not specialists and thus have access to less information about the industry, past 
performance of the entrepreneur and many other pieces of value-relevant information. Moreover, the entrepreneur 
might be even more reluctant to disclose information to this type of investors, due to their number and lack of 
professionalism.  
 
However, not all investors require the same level of information disclosure from borrowers. Most of the 
time, investors acquiring equity ask for more information than debt financers since they bear more risk. Related to 
this point, Ueda (2004) finds that entrepreneurs who go to VCs are more likely to have secured their ideas via 
intellectual property rights, which also implies that the entrepreneur’s legal environment has a direct influence on his 
choice. 
 
3.2.3 Organizational Form 
 
 A main finding in Lambert and Schwienbacher (2010) is that not-for-profit organizations tend to be more 
successful in achieving their fundraising targets as compared to for-profit organizations. This suggests that the 
organizational form may be an important driver of the success of crowdfunding initiatives. Lambert and 
Schwienbacher (2010) suggest that a possible explanation for this result stems from the fact that not-for-profit 
organizations may be more prone to commit to high quality products or services. In contrast, for-profit organizations 
will set their quantity-quality mix that only maximizes corporate profits. Since not-for-profit organizations put less 
emphasis on profit making, they may therefore focus more on quality, which may be an important requirement for 
attracting donations (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001). 
 
3.2.4 Control Preferences 
 
An extensive part of literature exists on possible conflicts of interest between owners and managers. Short 
(1994) find that performance is affected by the ownership structure since it has consequences on the strategy. 
Particularly, in line with the general consensus (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000), they show that owners want to focus 
on profit maximization in order to maximize dividends, while managers might have more value creation/prestige-
related goals like being innovative (Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2002). 
 
Following the incomplete contracting literature, Hart and Moore (1998) show that control needs to be 
clearly held by one of the parties (owners or managers) but not both, so that conflicts of interest cannot appear in 
decision-making. This can be the case for instance for ethical companies that do not want to have shareholders 
focused more on profits rather than on accomplishing the ethical mission of the firm. However, owner-manager 
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firms may also become less efficient than when the functions are separated subsequent to a lack of managerial 
monitoring and oversight functions by external shareholders. This can partially be explained by the interest of 
owner-managers to be their own boss, and focus less on growth (Berger and Udell, 1998). Venture capital funds 
structure their contracts in such a way that ownership and control becomes largely separate (Hellmann, 1998). Cash 
flow and control rights may further shift hands over time, depending on pre-specified contingencies. Berglöf (1994) 
shows how this can be implemented with convertible preferred shares, as done by venture capitalists. However, this 
requires sophisticated contracting that is unsuitable for the crowd. 
 
One question is whether crowdfunders should be able to have their say on the management of the company. 
This issue deals with the legitimacy of such investors to control a company. Indeed, they might be quite numerous 
and each has brought only a small amount of money into the firm. How much power would they get then? And how 
could they exercise it? The Web 2.0 could at times be an alternative to high coordination cost where the number of 
investors is particularly large; in this case, voting power can be given to crowdfunders for very specific decisions 
about the product design or other corporate strategies. However it is unlikely to be manageable for any kind of 
managerial decision, such as voting right given the common shareholders in true equity issuance. 
 
3.2.5 Amounts Required By Entrepreneurs 
 
 How much money is needed in another discriminating factor? Indeed, financials have all different pre-
defined amounts they are willing to invest (Bhidé, 1992). For instance, there is a legal minimal threshold to be 
placed on the stock market; it prevents small companies to use it (Botazzi and Da Rin, 2001). In addition, its 
implementation cost is very high and imposes companies to have reached a certain scale and have reduced the risk 
factor (Berger and Udell, 1998). Similarly, VCs usually have high minimum investments that reveal to be unsuited 
to the needs of small ventures (Bhidé, 1992). Schwienbacher (2007) shows that this may lead to a crucial trade-off 
as to when to start entrepreneurial activities, since smaller amounts need to be financed by other investor types like 
business angels. 
 
 Besides, small business finance is highly and disproportionally affected by macroeconomic conditions 
(Berger and Udell, 1998). Indeed, market forecasts, stock market health, overall economy health, and monetary 
policy all have effects on small business finance. For example, the US credit crunch of 1990 caused the small firm 
lending to fall by 38% from $144bn to $88bn. VC financing is also affected by market conditions, since their entry 
is conditioned by their exit strategy based on the stock market health (Black and Gilson, 1998). 
 
3.2.6 Legal Issues Regarding Equity Issuance And Multiple Investors 
 
 Regulation on equity issuance for private companies may limit the extent to which crowdfunding can be a 
viable source of financing and the capacity of firms to seek funding from the crowd, as it may be perceived as being 
a general solicitation of public saving. Moreover, in some countries there is a limit on the number of shareholders 
that some forms of business organizations are allowed to have. 
 
 The case of Trampoline Systems clearly shows the legal concerns that companies may face. National 
regulations typically limit the extent to which companies can advertise security offerings to the public, limiting it 
often to qualified investors and people with whom the entrepreneur already has clear links. Regulators may limit the 
number of shareholders of a private company. Solving these issues has cost to Trampoline Systems significant time 
and legal costs in order to have its crowdfunding process in line with UK regulation for issuing equity privately. 
Among other things, it implied that the crowdfunding process had to be restricted to qualified investors, and the 
general public could not participate. 
 
 Therefore, the crowdfunding participation is often structured in the form of making the participating crowd 
a member instead of a shareholder, such as BeerBankroll and MyFootballClub (that now owns the club Ebbsfleet 
United). Others offer investors part of the revenues without issuing shares however. An interesting example is 
Sandawe that allows investors to finance comic books and earn a slice of the revenues generated by subsequent sales 
of the albums selected by investors. There, the crowdfunding initiative combines profit sharing and voting on which 
albums to sponsor with the money provided. 
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3.2.7 Efficiency And A Decreased Risk Arguments 
 
 Entrepreneurs may require external support on how to run their company or to assess the economic 
potential of their product. Unlike business angels or venture capital funds, crowdfunders might not have any special 
knowledge about the industry. This implies that a crowd can at times be more efficient than individuals or teams in 
solving corporate problems. Hence, crowdfunders as a crowd would be more efficient than a few equity investors 
alone. 
 
 From another point of view, the risk taken by crowdfunders might be smaller, and not only because of the 
small amounts that they provide individually. The crowd may further become consumers once the product has been 
brought to the market and have an incentive to disseminate the information about the product it if they participate in 
the profits of the venture.  
 
4. IMPACT OF THE FRENCH LEGAL REFORM ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CROWD-
FUNDING 
 
4.1 Situation Of Crowdfunding In France Before The Reform In September 2013 
 
 Before the bill (4 September 2013) to simplify and secure the live’s of companies, the crowdfunding had no 
own legislative framework, we must refer to the applicable rules of monetary exchanges and commitments. Each 
internet crowdfunding platform has its own modes. There is no uniformity. We need to identify for each legal 
consequences in order to understand them. Crowdfunding can be represented by different forms (gift, counterpart 
funding, lending and acquisition of securities). Each of these forms of practices is regulated by specific laws. 
However, these regulations are inadequate to websites. Indeed, the purpose of these sites is to finance projects with a 
multitude of small amounts made by individuals. 
 
 France has only two official documents dedicated to crowdfunding published by the ACP
2
 for the general 
public and to the AMF
3
 for platforms and project leaders. Therefore, official texts show that positive law is a real 
obstacle to the development of these sites. The main consequence is a leak in financing entrepreneurs in the United 
States where the legislation has become more interesting since the law Jobs April 2012.  
 
 In the end only one provision of the Lagarde’s law in July 2010 concerns the crowdfunding. This provision 
has been created, following a lobbying from certain platforms like babyloan.org. 
 
4.2 Impact Of Legal Reform On The Development Of Crowdfunding 
 
 In the entrepreneurship’s Audience (April 29, 2013), the President of the Republic announced the 
establishment of a secure environment for the development of crowdfunding legal framework. Indeed, these models 
are experiencing a rapid development in all countries. For example, Google has invested $ 125 million in the first 
platform of credit between individuals in the United States. This is the reason why the French government wants to 
render the crowdfunding as an activity managed and regulated. 
 
 September 30, 2013, is an important date for the development of the legal framework crowdfunding. The 
main measures that have been used are as follows: 
 
- A user cannot individually provide more than 250 euros even that each project should not exceed a 
fundraiser for € 300,000 only in respect of loans. 
- Under the bill on simplification of corporate life, government will in the first trimester in 2014 an 
ordinance creating the status of equity investment advisor. This status, which will pretender crowdfunding 
platforms require to have a level lower than that required for conventional financial institutions equity. 
                                                 
2 Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel 
3 Autorité des Marchés Financiers 
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- The regulation of banking monopolies will also change because it will allow loans between individuals 
with a limited amount to 250 euros for the lender and € 300,000 in total for the borrower. 
- The government has made a distinction between donations and investments. The first permits to participate 
in the financing of a project without becoming an investor, are not affected by the law. By cons, online 
loans will now be supervised. 
 
 These first steps of regulation show that France will be the only country with a status to fix crowdfunding. 
This is a real breakthrough. 
 
 Moreover, the fixed thresholds at 250 euros and 300 000 euros are some still too limited. However, the 
limit of € 300 000 per project is partially offset by the fact that all French can invest where, across the Atlantic, only 
qualified investors (with more than a million dollars in assets) can. Therefore, the range of investors is more 
important in France. It is possible to lift advantage of funds in the United States, but with fewer people. In addition, 
as outlined by the ministry, raise the threshold for example 300 000 to 1 million could prevent individuals from 
taking too many risks and that poor risk management is a platform to be bankrupt for mismanagement. 
 
 Other advances are also being studied. Indeed, it is interesting that the state supports the development of 
crowdfunding platforms by placing a portion of its cash as an investor - lender on crowdfunding platforms. For 
example in the UK, the government has recently decided to put 100 million pounds available to players’ 
crowdfunding in this form of “direct investment». As part of this program «Business Partnership», initiated by the 
Ministry "Business, Innovation and Skills», 7 platforms have already been selected: 4 for December 2012 for a total 
investment of 55 million pounds, 3 for March 2013 to an investment of 32 million pounds. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
 A new source of funding is becoming more and more important in the financial sphere for SMEs. Since the 
subprime crisis, SMEs suffer for a lack of loans and stricter rules for credit conditions. This new source allows 
SMEs to finance new projects. Crowdfunding platforms used are specialized in the financing of households, and 
also for SMEs. Different platforms of crowdfunding are created and they are raised several million euro. Recent 
works help to build a theoretical framework to understand the success of this new financing source, Franke and 
Klausberger (2008), and Lambert and Schwienbacher (2010). However, the lack of regulation is a barrier to 
commercial development. Crowdfunding is expected to replace significant parts of the banking system. It responds 
to main concerns of borrowers, transparency savings and utilization in the service of the real economy, for 
individuals or professionals projects, simple credit products and lower rates than those by banks. With an 
appropriate regulation, crowdfunding growth is expected to be even faster. 
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